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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the likelihood that Iran’s nuclear program poses a threat to American 
foreign-policy interests and the extent to which the American response has succeeded in reducing 
this threat. The researcher conducted this assessment using publicly available data from 
governmental or intergovernmental agencies such as the IAEA and the CIA, think tanks such as 
the Brookings Institute, and contemporary press reports. The findings indicate that Iran’s nuclear 
program has some military aspects, which might pose a threat to American security interests 
either by emboldening the Iranian leadership to engage in brinksmanship or by increasing the 
Israeli perception of Iran as a threat. This threat appears to be exacerbated by the failure of most 
American responses to reduce the threat from the nuclear program, with the partial exceptions of 
the sanctions regimes and cyberwarfare tactics applied to Iran. 
 
In 2009, an Iranian nuclear scientist named Shahram Amiri vanished while on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca, raising suspicions in the Iranian media that he had been kidnapped. They were proved 
partially right after Amiri turned up in Tucson claiming to be a defector.  The resulting cascade 
of media claims and counterclaims—Amiri later claimed to have been kidnapped, while Iranian 
media suggested that he was a double agent-- was one of many moves in a key part of American 
foreign policy: the shadow war over Iran’s nuclear program.1 
The Iranian nuclear program dates back to the reign of Shah Reza Pahlavi, during the 
alliance between the United States and Iran. However, this program was continued well after 
Pahlavi’s reign and into the strongly anti-American government of the Ayatollah Khomeini. 2  In 
spite of Iranian claims to the contrary, international intelligence agencies therefore have long 
suspected that Iran’s post-Pahlavi nuclear program may have a military purpose3. Consequently, 
the questions of greatest concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program are:  1) “Does Iran’s nuclear 
program pose a threat to American interests?” and 2) “What responses are most likely to have a 
                                               
1
 Crist, David. The Twilight War:  The Secret History Of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran. 2012. Penguin. 
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 Berman, Illan. Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge To The United States. 2005. Rowan & Littlefield, Oxford. Pg. 32.  
3
 Amano, Yuki. “IAEA Board Report.” 5 June 2013. IAEA. 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-27.pdf Pg. 13.  
1
Menon: The Iranian Nuclear Program And American Responses, 2000-2012
Menon 2 
 
desirable result?”4 Given the controversy over the view of Iran as a hostile nation, notably 
expressed in Kenneth Waltz’s 2012 article “Why Iran Should Get The Bomb,” the first question 
is considered in two parts: “Is the Iranian nuclear program military?” and, secondly, “Should Iran 
be allowed to have a military nuclear program?” 
 Regarding the final question, “What responses are most likely to have a desirable 
result?”, this study focuses on the individual viability of the four primary solutions to the 
problem of Iran’s nuclear program actively attempted by the Bush and Obama administrations 
between 2000 and 2012,: the Bush administration’s effort to foster prodemocracy activism 
within Iran from 2005-2007, the Obama administration’s outreach attempt in late 2009, the 
sanctions regimes under both administrations, and the Bush and Obama cyberwarfare programs. 
The Bush and Obama approaches to the Iranian nuclear program are widely regarded, to some 
extent, as methodological opposites, with Bush emphasizing sanctions and threats of military 
strikes and Obama emphasizing firstly diplomacy and then sanctions.5 Considering the success 
of the Bush and Obama approaches offers a useful “comparison” within a widely varying range 
of American policy on Iran. 
The answers to these questions offer many implications for American political and 
economic security.  As noted in Section Two of this paper, the Islamic Republic has—unlike 
other members of President Bush’s “axis of evil”-- shown itself willing to launch proxy attacks 
on American citizens and allies when this is in its interest, and equally willing to cooperate with 
the United States on matters of common ground. Iran’s intentions toward the United States 
cannot, therefore, simply be taken on face value.  Analyzing Iran’s intentions regarding its 
nuclear program, the possible results of these intentions, and the track record of previous 
engagements with Iran could help avoid either unnecessarily opposing a relatively well-
intentioned Iran and thereby endangering regional interests or, in the worst case, a lengthy and 
costly war with a potential nuclear power.   
 
1. Nature of The Iranian Nuclear Program 
 
Today, the general term “Iranian nuclear program” describes a wide variety of nuclear 
facilities.  According to the Congressional Research Service, the facilities which are a primary 
concern to the United States are Iran’s construction of gas centrifuges and the creation of so-
called “heavy water” nuclear reactors. 6 Centrifuging uranium hexafluoride gas can produce low-
enrichment uranium (LEU) or high-enrichment uranium (HEU), while the spent fuel of heavy 
water reactors can contain plutonium. In turn, plutonium, LEU, and HEU can be used in nuclear 
weapons. Iran is currently running three declared gas centrifuge facilities: a program at Natanz 
which tests new centrifuges, a commercial facility also at Natanz, and a centrifuge facility at 
Fordow. Iran also has a pair of currently known reactors, one of which is a heavy-water reactor 
under construction at Arak, which will supposedly reach full power in 2013. (Iran’s only fully 
developed reactor, a “light-water” reactor near the city of Bushehr, is not as easily turned to 
                                               
4
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military use.) Note that a truly definitive account of Iran’s nuclear facilities is likely impossible 
at this point, however, due to the strong possibility of covert Iranian nuclear facilities (see the 
following paragraph). In any case, by August 2012, the Islamic Republic of Iran had produced 
enough nuclear fuel, in the form of low-enrichment uranium, to produce enriched uranium for 
several nuclear missiles.7 
The Iranian government has consistently claimed that its nuclear program has only 
civilian aspects, which purportedly gives their program legitimacy under the UN’s Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). For example, as recently as November 19th of the previous year, Ali 
Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian ambassador to the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA (International 
Atomic Energy Agency), claimed that a recent IAEA report “… confirmed that Iran’s nuclear 
activities, including enrichment, are peaceful.”8 According to spokespersons for the Iranian 
government, the gas centrifuges are intended to produce only LEU for civilian energy reactors. 
Similarly, Ambassador Soltanieh has claimed that Iran’s current and projected heavy-water 
reactors are exclusively for the production of radioactive isotopes to treat cancer patients.  In 
turn, Iranian spokesmen such as Soltanieh argue that international law allows nations to 
undertake such nominally civilian nuclear projects. Specifically, under the NPT, to which the 
Islamic Republic was a signatory in 1970, Iran has the right to facilitate and partake in “…the 
further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,”9albeit “through 
an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.” 
In response to the latter part of the clause, sources of the Iranian government such as Soltanieh 
and Iran’s PressTV hold that the IAEA has never found evidence of a military nuclear program10 
and state that the IAEA is the only “appropriate international body” with the authority to verify 
the nuclear activities of member states.11 Thus, the government of Iran holds that its nuclear 
development is approved by international law and therefore unobjectionable. 
However, Iran’s inconsistent and incomplete degree of cooperation in opening its sites to 
IAEA inspection, combined with a similar lack of cooperation with IAEA demands and treaties, 
has made its claims of a “peaceful” civilian program suspect. It is certainly true that several of 
Iran’s nuclear sites are open to UN inspection; furthermore, the IAEA reports that no nuclear 
material from these declared sites has been diverted for military purposes. Nevertheless, Iran has 
a history of hiding its nuclear facilities from IAEA inspection. For example, in 2002, a group of 
Iranian exiles revealed that Iran had been developing undeclared nuclear facilities in the village 
of Arak. Similarly, the Ahmadinejad administration did not report its nuclear facility at Qom 
until it became known to the American intelligence community12. And as recently as August 
2012, IAEA Director-General Yuki Amano reported that individuals at a suspected nuclear site, 
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Parchin, seemed to be engaged in attempts to disguise the site.13  Furthermore, the Iranian 
government has consistently refused to open certain suspected nuclear sites to IAEA inspection. 
For example, the May 2013 report by the IAEA concludes that “… as Iran is not providing the 
necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is 
unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful 
activities”(my italics).14 In turn, it is hard not to read the Iranian refusal to open its nuclear 
facilities to inspection as suspect: why would a nation with nothing to hide have to prevent the 
United Nations from viewing its nuclear facilities?  Note too that the Iranian government has not 
given an official explanation of why they have chosen to hide these facilities.  Thus, the Iranian 
refusal to make their suspected nuclear sites open to inspection is cause for some suspicion. 
Secondly, IAEA reports and reports from Western intelligence communities strongly 
suggest that Iran’s covert uranium enrichment activities may have some military purpose. 
Specifically, although the strongest evidence for an active Iranian nuclear weapons program 
dates back to 2003, it is likely that Iran’s nuclear program still has some military aspects, either 
in the form of a breakout capacity or in plans for full nuclearization. Firstly, according to a 2009 
ISIS (Institute of Science and International Security) report, the IAEA is in possession of 
documents that strongly suggest that Iran prior to 2003 had serious interest in developing nuclear 
weapons, an assessment that several Western intelligence communities appear to agree with15. 
For example, one such document appeared to be a plan to reconfigure Iran’s Shahab-3 missile to 
accommodate a nuclear warhead. In their official response to a report on the subject by former 
IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei, the Khatami administration stated that these 
documents were forgeries by the United States, suggested that the contents of the documents 
were internally inconsistent and “lacked classification seals.” 16 This argument, however, is 
contradicted by the actual report which the “Explanatory Comments” purportedly treated. El-
Baradei’s report states that the documents were provided by several member states of the United 
Nations (which would presumably necessitate a conspiracy broader than the United States) over 
several periods of time and were internally consistent. Although these documents suggest that 
such attempts at weaponization were stopped after 200317, such information does not do great 
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credit to the truthfulness of later Iranian claims under the administration of Khameini.18  
Furthermore, current sources also suggest, with varying degrees of certainty, that Iran may 
currently be aiming at a nuclear weapons program or a breakout capacity.  For example, IAEA 
reports state that Iran is currently carrying out conventional military experiments which may 
have nuclear applications.19 Similarly, prior to returning to Iran in 2010, Shahram Amiri 
reportedly stated to the CIA that the Iranian government was attempting to decide between a 
breakout capacity and the development of an active nuclear weapons program.20 Although 
Iranian sources—and, albeit possibly under threat, Amiri himself21-- have alleged that Amiri was 
in fact a double agent or had been kidnapped by the United States, press reports22 allege that 
Amiri has been placed on trial for treason, and several parts of the Iranian opposition have 
reportedly alleged that Amiri has been tortured in confinement.23 And Amiri has been mentioned 
noticeably little by official Iranian sources. 24 is hard to see why Amiri would disappear from 
Iranian official media if he were a national hero, but it would make sense if Amiri were in fact a 
defector—i.e. if the information he had provided the United States was credible. Thus, credible 
sources suggest that Iran is currently developing  a nuclear program with military applications. 
 Finally, there are several disparities between the requirements of a civilian nuclear 
program and Iran’s nuclear program, further suggesting that Iran’s nuclear program is not purely 
civilian. Firstly, given Iran’s sizeable oil reserves, Iran’s nuclear program would be redundant, if 
not downright economically counterproductive, if it were civilian. For example, over 6 million 
kilowatts of electricity were exported from Iran in 2011—hardly the behavior of a country in 
need of alternative sources of energy.25  In turn, the development of unnecessary nuclear power 
is considerably more expensive than the usage of natural gas plants: as Mark Helprin of the 
Claremont Institute has pointed out, “…why spend $1,000-$2,000 per kilowatt to build nuclear 
plants instead of $400-$800 for natural gas plants, when you possess the second largest gas 
reserves in the world?” 26 This is especially telling given the fact that Iran’s current reserves of 
uranium ore are estimated as large enough to support the development of several hundred nuclear 
weapons—but, as several Iranian officials have admitted27, are not large enough to support the 
                                               
18
 As Supreme Leader of Iran, Khameini has the authority to delineate all general policy (regardless of the role of 
either Khatami or Ahmadinejad) and presumably would have at least known about—if he was not involved in—
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development of Iran’s projected civilian program. Furthermore, the rate at which Iran has been 
enriching uranium far outstrips its number of reactors: in 2006, for instance, Iran had a single 
nuclear reactor but reportedly planned to install “upwards of fifty million centrifuges.”28  The 
work of some analysts, such as that by Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, suggests that these discrepancies may simply be due to poor planning, pointing in 
particular to a 2005 Khameini fatwa against the indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons.29 Yet 
the Khameini administration has not hesitated to deal out other kinds of indiscriminate violence 
when necessary. For example, in 2011, the Justice Department alleged that the Quds Force, a 
special branch of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, had attempted to blow up a Washington restaurant 
where the Saudi ambassador was eating, with the knowledge that this would seriously endanger 
the Americans inside.30 And as Fitzpatrick himself notes, “…fatwas can be overturned if 
circumstances change: for example [sic] if the nation were seen to be facing a mortal threat.”31 In 
short, the existence of Khameini’s fatwa against nuclear weapons is in no measure a guarantee of 
the Khameini administration’s intentions. Thus, then, it is reasonable to provisionally assume 
that Iran’s nuclear program is intended to produce a nuclear weapon or breakout capacity.  
 
2. Threat Posed By The Iranian Nuclear Program 
 
Allowing Iran to gain nuclear weapons would mean allowing a nation which has been 
actively opposed to American regional interests to become a nuclear power. Specifically, under 
the administration of Supreme Leader Khameini, the Islamic Republic has engaged in proxy 
violence against America and American allies, in an attempt to limit Western power in the 
Middle East and thereby become a regional power in its own right.  For example, in 2001, the 
Islamic Republic released a captured Afghanistan Taliban commander (who then organized 
resistance to the American-backed Karzai government) and started a campaign of anti-American 
propaganda in northern Afghanistan. This was due to the blowback of a speech in which then-
President Bush depicted Iran as part of an “axis of evil”; Iranian officials saw this not merely as 
an insult but as a rejection of talks which the Iranian government felt would allow it to avoid 
American threats to its power and utilize its regional influence in Afghanistan with American 
consent32.This attempt to expand Iran’s regional power through proxy war has also extended to 
regional American allies who appear to threaten Iranian power, particularly Israel. Throughout 
Supreme Leader Khameini’s tenure, Iran has supported acts of terrorism against Israel, offering 
financial support of over $100 million (as of 2012) to the anti-Israeli group Hezbollah.33 This 
commitment to the cause of the heavily Sunni Palestinians—in spite of the strong differences 
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between Sunni and Shia Islamists—derives in part from the Supreme Leader’s attempts to 
solidify his ideological influence over the Middle East’s Muslims34 and in part from Iran’s view 
of itself as a regional great power with Israel as its primary Middle Eastern enemy35. Thus, Iran 
has historically seen itself as opposed to the United States’ interests and has acted accordingly. 
 It is likely that in spite of this opposition of interests, the logic of nuclear deterrence 
would prevent a nuclear Iran from using nuclear weapons against other nations, directly or 
through its terrorist proxies. Analysts such as Clifford May36 have argued that Iran’s hypothetical 
use of nuclear weapons would be driven by an unreasoning, potentially self-destructive hatred of 
the West and of Israel, pointing to public statements that seem to advocate attack on both 
nations. For example, May claims that Iran intends to “weaken America (‘Satan incarnate’), and 
wipe Israel off the map” once it has gained nuclear weapons—the latter presumably a reference 
to ex-President Ahmadinejad’s statement that “Israel must be wiped off the page of time.”37 
However, it is more likely that such rhetoric is theatrical rather than prescriptive, intended to 
appeal to a particular anti-American or anti-Israeli base of support. (For example, as noted by 
Sanger38, prior to the Green Revolution, Ahmadinejad had considerable support on the basis of 
his perceived anti-Americanism.) This is especially likely given the fact that the Iranian 
government has historically acted rationally when opposed by the United States, even when these 
acts would be in contradiction to its stated ideals. For example, the Ayatollah Khomeini initially 
opposed the development of chemical weapons on religious grounds, but eventually allowed 
investment in chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.39 Similarly, and more germanely to 
the Khameini administration, Iranian and American officials actively collaborated against 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, if only because the Iranian government viewed Hussein as a threat to its 
own security—in spite of the avowedly anti-American tenor of the revolutionary government’s 
ideals.40 Thus, the Iranian government has historically been capable of acting rationally, even in 
contradiction to its stated ideals, to preserve what it believes to be its self-interest. In turn, this 
makes it likely that the current Iranian government will not attempt to make a direct attack on the 
United States or its allies should it gain a nuclear weapon. Similarly, Waltz41 and Byman42 have 
pointed out that Iran is not likely to pass nuclear weapons to Hezbollah and its other proxies, due 
to the probable Western retaliation that such an act would incur. (American intelligence 
capabilities are reportedly enough to detect the transfer of a nuclear weapon from Iran to a 
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proxy.) Indeed, Iran already possesses chemical weapons of mass destruction but has no history 
of passing these on to terrorist proxies.43 And given the recent fraying of Iran’s relationship with 
its Sunni quasi-proxy Hamas and the reported political marginalization of Hezbollah,44 it is 
unlikely that Iran would trust one of its proxies with something of as much sensitivity as a 
nuclear weapon. Thus, a nuclear Iran would not lead to a nuclear war.  
However, it is likely that the possession of a nuclear weapon or of breakout capacity will 
make Iran more bellicose, at least for a short period. In the first possible case of full 
nuclearization, possession of a nuclear weapon would give Iran a sense of invulnerability via the 
logic of deterrence, causing it to increase non-military belligerent activities such as support for 
terrorist proxies. As Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institute puts it: “A nuclear weapon… 
would give Tehran the ability to threaten a devastating response should it be attacked with 
conventional forces.”45  This argument has been controversial, and some, most notably Kenneth 
Waltz, have opposed it, on the grounds that several other nuclear nations have become less 
belligerent after gaining nuclear weapons, due to the increase in attention from other great 
powers. Waltz points particularly to the example of Maoist China, which he claims became 
considerably more restrained after obtaining a nuclear weapon. 46 However, a considerable 
amount of empirical evidence suggests that possession of a nuclear weapon may, in fact, cause 
nations to become more bold in its increase in proxy warfare. For example, Waltz fails to note 
that Maoist China’s “restrained” behavior after it tested a nuclear weapon in 1964 included an 
unprovoked attack on Soviet border guards—an attack on a country which had historically been 
Maoist China’s most powerful ally-- five years after the test. (Although China had engaged in 
proxy war in Korea prior to the nuclear test, the Chinese involvement in Korea was reluctant and 
had considerable Soviet backing—thus is not comparable to the attack after the test.47) Similarly, 
other nations which have been offered48 as examples of nuclearization’s restraining effects are 
known to have increased hostile actions vis-à-vis other nations. For example, Pakistan’s support 
of anti-Indian militants, including in a 2001 attack on the Kashmiri district of Kargil, increased 
after both nations tested nuclear weapons.49 These examples strongly suggest that the perceived 
protection offered by a nuclear weapon can increase a state’s belligerence.  A similar conclusion 
is upheld by quantitative research on the subject, which suggests that although the possession of 
nuclear weapons does not significantly increase a state’s belligerence in the long run, it can 
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increase a state’s belligerence shortly following its development of nuclear weapons.50 The 
second possible case, that of an Iran with a breakout capacity, would likely have the same effect. 
Having a breakout capacity would provide Iran with security similar to that provided by a 
nuclear weapons program. That is, given that at least one known Iranian nuclear facility is 
considered close to impossible to destroy51, which would allow a breakout-capable Iran to 
quickly develop a nuclear weapon if attacked, the logic of deterrence would work for a breakout-
capable power much as it does for a nuclear power.  In short, if the Islamic Republic is allowed 
to develop either a breakout capacity or nuclear weaponry, its support of terrorist proxies is 
likely to increase. 
Furthermore, the increased likelihood of an Iranian nuclear program seems to be 
increasing the Israeli government’s willingness to launch an attack on Iran—which, in turn, 
would seriously endanger American military interests. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu recently 
expressed willingness to strike against Iran on its own should the United States not take strong 
preventative action against the Iranian nuclear program.52  Similarly, a recent report by the 
Congressional Research Service suggests that Israeli decisionmakers are more likely to be 
seriously considering an attack on Iran: Israeli officials generally view Iran as a serious, if not 
existential, threat.53 And in 2011, Netanyahu forced out four heads of security who had been 
strongly opposed to an Israeli attack on Iran. 54 Furthermore, Israel has recently shown itself 
increasingly willing to take violent action specifically against Iran’s nuclear program: since 
2010, Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated and Iranian nuclear facilities have been 
sabotaged in what appear to be Mossad initiatives.55  Thus, it seems more likely than not that 
Israel is seriously considering launching an attack on Iran in the event of Iranian nuclearization. 
In turn, an attack by Israel on Iran, if carried out, would likely be dangerous to American 
interests. A series of 2012 White House simulations of an Iranian-Israeli war ended in Iranian 
defeat only at the cost of heavy American involvement, as did a similar exercise held by the 
Brookings Institute in 2009.56 That is, an Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic would lead to 
considerable loss of American life. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that the economic impact 
on the United States of a war with Iran would be significant. Analysts such as Geoffrey Kemp of 
the Center for the National Interest have argued that a war with Iran would damage relationships 
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with major trading partners such as China, while causing oil prices to spike.57 And with the 
United States officially 14 trillion dollars in debt58, a hypothetical expenditure on a war with Iran 
should be avoided as far as possible. Thus, it seems likely that Iran’s nuclear program poses a 
threat to American security, political and economic interests. 
 
3. Current Solutions: Which Is Most Likely To Produce A Desirable Result? 
 
The Bush administration’s first attempt to address Iran’s nuclear program, a series of pro-
democracy propaganda initiatives by Elizabeth Cheney’s Iran-Syria Working Group, likely 
played little role in helping to foster American and Iranian cooperation on the issue of Iran’s 
nuclear program. Beginning in around 2003, the Bush administration launched a series of soft-
power attempts to cause the overthrow of the Iranian government, focusing primarily on 
providing anti-governmental propaganda and creating contact points between reform-minded 
Iranians and the United States. (Some sanctions were also laid down, but these do not seem to 
have been the focus of the Working Group.)59 For example, the  Iran-Syria Working Group 
expanded the State Department’s International Information Program in hopes of providing 
ordinary Iranians with more information about the United States, while simultaneously 
pressuring radio stations such as Voice of America and Radio Farda to provide anti-Iranian 
propaganda. However, it is likely such propaganda efforts served largely to force ordinary 
Iranians into a more aggressive stance vis-à-vis the United States and their nuclear program.  
Firstly, the tenor of the Bush administration’s publications actively fostered anti-American 
public opinion in Iran, thus lessening the likelihood of either cooperation with the Iranian 
government or of (as originally planned) regime change from within.  For example, due to 
pressure from the Bush administration, Voice of America began featuring guests such as the 
head of the anti-Shia militia Jundallah, which has been responsible for the deaths of numerous 
Iranian civilians,60 and the former Crown Prince of Persia, who has little support inside Iran.6162 
Significantly, State Department polls prior to the Group’s inception reported enthusiastic civilian 
Iranian support for the United States, while an October 2012 poll after these efforts—the Iran-
Syria Working Group, its primary conduit, folded in 200763--reportedly showed that many 
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Iranians consider the United States an adversary64.  Thus, the Bush administration’s soft-power 
attempts have largely served to isolate the Iranian populace from the intended message. It is 
perhaps worth noting that in 2005, shortly after some initiatives had been put in place, the Iranian 
populace elected the conservative, pro-nuclear Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,65 in an election which 
David Crist has called “flawed but fair.”66 Furthermore, the propaganda effort’s effect upon any 
of the serious reform groups within Iran, of which the most viable (and therefore representative) 
is the Green Movement67, has been minimal: the members and representatives of the Green 
Movement have largely rejected rapprochement with the United States. For example, Mir 
Houssein Mousavi, one of the most prominent Green leaders, has publicly yearned for a return to 
the years of Ayatollah Khomeini, has heavily hedged his tentative appreciation of President 
Obama’s outreach in Iran—“If his actions are in keeping with his words, why shouldn't we 
negotiate?”68—and has even claimed that Iran’s nuclear program is a completely transparent 
civilian program. In turn, it is likely that Mousavi is representative of much of the Green 
constituency, or at least has considerable standing within the movement; projected protests in 
2010 were organized and then disbanded almost entirely on his orders and on that of a less-
influential69 opposition leader, Mehdi Karroubi. Furthermore, members of the Green movement 
have rejected direct American involvement in or support for the movement. For example, a series 
of Green memos to Washington requested only that President Obama implement stronger 
sanctions and verbally condemn Iran’s human-rights abuses, while asking that Obama refrain 
from more direct interference (i.e. military action).70 It is worth noting, too, that the 
aforementioned Green activists chose to endure over five months of the Iranian government’s 
violent crackdown on protesters before asking for this limited American aid. Analysts such as 
Abbas Milani, who call for American support of the Green Movement, have contested this 
argument, pointing in particular to rank-and-file Green protesters who chant slogans that appeal 
directly to the United States (for example, “Obama, Obama, you’re either with them, or you’re 
with us”). Considering the points raised above, however, it is more likely that these slogans did 
not represent a desire for rapprochement as much as a desire for the international legitimacy that 
American recognition would give them. Finally, the opposition movement in and of itself has 
historically had little significant impact on the Iranian regime’s willingness to cooperate with the 
United States. For example, talks between the United States and Iran in November 2010 and 
January 2011—in the wake of several minor protests—were left at a standstill.71  In short, the 
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‘Velvet Revolution’ is likely to have little effect in terms of regime change or on Iran’s 
cooperation with American preferences. 
 The first attempt of the Obama administration to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, an 
attempt at diplomatic engagement with the Supreme Leader known colloquially as the “charm 
offensive,” was not any more effective than the Bush administration’s efforts, due largely to the 
strongly anti-American political base of the Supreme Leader and the Iranian government’s long-
held fear of American interference, which the Green Revolution exacerbated. Shortly after his 
inauguration, in a sharp departure from President Bush’s more confrontational stance, President 
Obama repeatedly announced his readiness to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program, 
without preconditions. This was followed by several small tokens of good faith aimed 
specifically at the Supreme Leader, such as an exchange of letters in 2009. Note that these 
outreach efforts focused particularly on the Supreme Leader, on the grounds that Khameini was 
the primary decisionmaker in terms of Iran’s defense policy.72 However, the Ayatollah 
Khameini’s ideologically and politically deep-rooted anti-Americanism, coupled with the onset 
of the Green Revolution, have made it unlikely that the “charm offensive” will bear any fruit in 
future. Firstly, political conditions in Iran have consistently made it in Supreme Leader 
Khameini’s interest and in accordance with his temperament—even in times of considerable 
economic or political turmoil—to evince a strong anti-Americanism, thus leading .As Abbas 
Milani has noted, Khameini’s relative lack of religious credentials upon his appointment forced 
him develop his support base primarily among wings of the government known for conservatism 
and anti-Americanism, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian 
paramilitary security forces, the Basij73. Furthermore, Khameini was deeply involved in the 
conservative Islamic aspect of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which was strongly anti-American. 
Thus, even before the Green Revolution, Khameini publicly rejected Obama’s offers of 
engagement.74 Furthermore, the domestic political crisis caused by the Green Revolution fored 
Khameini’s government to further reject American offers.  Note that Khameini’s anti-
Americanism was, to a degree, based on a genuine fear of American attempts at undercutting the 
Islamic Republic. Historically, the members of Khameini’s generation have long been concerned 
about American involvement in Iranian internal affairs75, a fear born in part of the impression left 
by American involvement in pre-Revolution Iranian politics.76 Thus, the Supreme Leader was 
reportedly sure that the West was behind the Green Revolution77. Note too that the power base 
which Khameini then turned to for support, like the Basij, was—as mentioned before-- strongly 
anti-American.78 Accordingly, throughout the Green Revolution, Khameini rejected the United 
States both on the grounds of its perceived interference and out of political necessity.  For 
example, during the Green Revolution, Khameini attempted to defend himself in the eyes of his 
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constituents by casting blame for the Revolution on the CIA79, even showcasing the hitherto 
classified letter from Obama as evidence of American duplicity.  And the Iranian government 
angrily broke off talks with the United States: for example, in October 2009, Tehran refused an 
American offer which would have ensured a supply of enriched uranium for Iran’s nuclear 
reactor in exchange for Iran’s cooperation on IAEA safeguards. 80 Thus, it is unlikely that 
Obama’s charm offensive could have had any useful ramifications. Furthermore, although some 
parts of Obama’s charm offensive, such as an appearance on Persian television, were partially 
appeals to the Iranian public, the charm offensive does not seem to have had noticeably lasting 
effect on the Iranian populace.  As discussed in the previous paragraphs, there have been no 
viable democratic movements within Iran that are linked to the United States. Thus, it is unlikely 
that Obama’s pre-2012 outreach effort will in and of itself produce any viable ramifications.  
 Thirdly, while both the Bush and Obama administrations engaged in sanctions against 
Iran, these sanctions showed no utility in provoking Iranian engagement but limited usefulness in 
sparking potentially useful internal tension. Throughout their tenures, both Presidents Bush and 
Obama attempted to limit Iran’s economic contact with the United States and other nations. For 
example, the Bush and Obama administrations confirmed the Clinton administration’s bans on 
most trade between Ian and the United States.81 Both administrations also drew upon their 
contacts with other nations to limit Iran’s other international trade as far as possible. For 
example, in July 2012, America waived sanctions on India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, and 
three other economies in exchange for a pledge of a one-fifth drop in their purchases of Iranian 
oil.82 And Iran has been largely shut out of the international banking system: foreign banks that 
transact with Iranian banks, such as Credit Suisse in a well-publicized case, have had to pay 
heavy fines.83 In turn, while these sanctions were not successful in forcing Iranian cooperation, 
these sanctions may prove effective in triggering regime change, which would potentially be 
useful to the United States. Firstly, it is unlikely that these sanctions, in their highly stringent 
form as of 2012, have altered the Iranian unwillingness to negotiate. Both ex-President 
Ahmadinejad and, more importantly, Supreme Leader Khameini, showed unwillingness to come 
to terms with the United States even during the stiff sanctions of 2012 and its accompanying 
social unrest: Tehran has still not responded to a proposal that came out of talks in February. 
(Under this proposal, sanctions would have been eased in response to Iran’s ending the 
production of highly enriched fuel.84) And as of early 2013, the Congressional Research Service 
reported that Iran’s stockpiling of low-enrichment uranium, as well as its belligerent foreign 
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policy, had not ceased. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the election of the moderate Hassan 
Rouhani to Iran’s presidency will significantly alter Iran’s nuclear policy. It is possible that 
Rouhani himself may not wish to do so: senior Iranian officials such as Foreign Policy 
Subcommitee Chairman Vahid Ahmadi have suggested that Rouhani will not seek to change 
Iranian nuclear policy. (Note too that Ahmadi chose to make this claim through Iran’s Fars News 
Agency, which has generally served as a mouthpiece of the Iranian government.) Even if 
Rouhani did wish to negotiate, his power would be severely curtailed by the historically 
uncooperative Supreme Leader Khameini, who exercises constitutional and practical power over 
Iranian foreign policy.85 And while Rouhani has purportedly sent out signals implying his 
willingness to bargain86, it is worth pointing out that the noncooperative Ahmadinejad 
administration, implying through its semi-official Fars News Agency that it will open Parchin to 
inspection87. However, sanctions do hold some potential in that they have produced enough 
domestic tension to seriously threaten the stability of the Iranian government, thus offering some 
future possibility of a government more amenable to American suggestions on the nuclear 
program. The sanctions regime has severely affected the state of the Iranian economy itself, with 
the prices of goods reportedly increasing daily.88 In turn, these sanctions have caused former 
bastions of support of the Iranian government to express considerable dissatisfaction with the 
Khameini administration. Many in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps now worry that 
sanctions may cut into the business perks they receive as Guard members.89 Press reports reveal 
that Iranian workers, a key interest group, have begun striking in increasing numbers earlier this 
year, and sources in the lower ranks of the Iranian army have expressed resentment over 
unprecedented slashes in basic benefits.90 And Nasser Shabani, a brigadier general in the 
Revolutionary Guard, earlier this year reportedly described this year as “critical” for the regime 
due to increasing protests against “poor living conditions.”91 Such widespread discontent might 
conceivably coincide with the Green Movement, which a 2012 CRS report claimed would soon 
be resurgent.92 Thus, sanctions offer the possibility of a wholesale governmental change within 
Iran, thus offering new opportunities for resolving the issue of Iran’s nuclear program.  
Note that while these sanctions have caused the United States few economic difficulties, 
it is possible that they may endanger American regional interests as Iran advertises the 
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humanitarian costs of these sanctions. On the one hand, oil prices have not significantly 
increased due to global sanctions on Iranian oil. In July 2012, India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, 
and three other economies pledged to cut their consumption of Iranian oil by one-fifth. However, 
thanks in part to increased output from Saudi Arabia, oil prices were still low in August 2012.93 
Furthermore, increased American production of oil— the International Energy Agency projects 
that the United States may export more oil than Saudi Arabia as early as 2017—may further 
lessen the economic shock of sanctions. This is in spite of the fact that as the fourth largest 
producer of oil in the world (as of 2011), Iran has had close economic ties with both the United 
States and several of America’s larger trading partners, such as India and China.94 However, 
current sanctions may, in future, worsen relations with regional interests among the Arab states. 
While the United States has placed sanctions on parts of the Iranian government which have 
been involved in human rights violations, the Iranian government has used the increased public 
suffering caused by sanctions to cast itself as an Islamist nation being oppressed by a Western 
power. For example, earlier this year, Iran’s semi-official Fars News Agency recently ran a pair 
of front-page articles in which the Supreme Leader and Mr. Ahmadinejad claimed that the 
“Western embargos” were “designed to hurt ordinary people.”95 In turn, it is propaganda may 
endanger American regional interests in the Middle East. Many Arab nations whose pro-
American rulers were either overthrown in the Arab Spring (for example, Egypt) or who are 
dealing with significant internal strife occasioned by the Arab Spring (for example, Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain) were regional allies in anti-Iranian policies. Furthermore, many of these newly 
vocal publics have a strong interest in America’s treatment of human rights in the Middle East96. 
This is especially as several of the nations affected by the Arab Spring are important regional 
interests for the United States in themselves: for example, America has long sought cooperation 
with Egyptian governments against terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula, which is important in the 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict97. Allowing the United States to be seen as an enemy 
to human rights might complicate relations with these key nations. Thus, while the Bush and 
Obama sanctions avoided endangering the American economy, they carry ramifications that may 
endanger future regional interests in the Middle East.  
Finally, the Bush and Obama administrations have made several covert computer-based 
attempts to physically destroy Iranian nuclear infrastructure, which are limited by their 
considerable cost and—to a much greater extent—by the fact that cyberwarfare has never been 
more than a stopgap measure to buy time for more effective measures. Beginning in the second 
term of the Bush Administration, the White House has been working on Operation Olympic 
Games, in which American and Israeli programmers insert computer viruses into the computer 
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infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear plants. Unlike the other measures described in this paper, the 
covert methods of Olympic Games were explicitly intended by both Presidents as a supplemental 
measure to buy time –“perhaps eighteen months to two years”—while other attempts were made 
to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.98 From about 2006 to 2010, the virus Stuxnet 
reportedly destroyed so many centrifuges that Iranian engineers, unsure of their own designs, 
began to throw away intact centrifuges and fire members of its staff, causing a significant 
slowdown in the program: after a decade, Natanz now holds approximately a thousand 
centrifuges, a fifth of the centrifuges it was intended to hold.  Furthermore, given the 
technological crudity of Iranian nuclear facilities99 and the fact that Olympic Games is still in 
progress, it is likely that Olympic Games will continue to be effective at setting back the Iranian 
nuclear program. Firstly, Olympic Games, at an estimated cost of $300 million100, is a 
considerable drain on the American treasury, which is itself already—as previously mentioned 
deeply in debt. However, while the value of Olympic Games cannot be determined without full 
knowledge of the nature and intended use of Iran’s nuclear program, it is clear that the United 
States has been able to make considerable headway during the period in which Olympic Games 
was slowing down the Iranian nuclear program. For example, the sanctions on Iran’s banking 
system were mobilized between 2006 and 2010. In turn, these sanctions, along with the sanctions 
on Iran’s oil industry, were reportedly critical in slashing the value of the Iranian rial and thus 
triggering the potentially destabilizing domestic unrest in Iran.101 Thus, the cost of Olympic 
Games may be mitigated by its (currently unknown) effects. More dangerously, however, 
Olympic Games is limited by its acknowledged lack of permanence: the Iranian government has 
shown itself capable of reversing the effects of cyberwarfare. For example, external experts have 
pointed out that Iranian enrichment efforts are now at the same or increased levels compared to 
Olympic Games’ inception, possibly because the Iranians have simply attempted to increase the 
speed of their remaining centrifuges.102 In short, America’s physical attacks on the Iranian 
nuclear program have had mixed success: they may be effective in bringing about some kind of 
rapprochement—or a complete halt to the program—in combination with sanctions or diplomatic 
rapprochement, as an attempt to buy time. Cyberwarfare is not a solution in and of itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While Iranian spokespersons and state media have frequently asserted that their nuclear 
program is civilian, their poor record of cooperation with the IAEA, a significant amount of 
corroborating evidence, and the decidedly non-civilian appearance of their program all suggest 
otherwise. In turn, allowing Iran to have a nuclear weapon could increase Iranian brinksmanship 
and (possibly) draw the United States into an Iranian-Israeli war. Furthermore, out of the four 
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responses to the program attempted so far, democracy promotion and rapprochement are likely 
ineffective. And while sanctions and cyberwarfare are effective, the humanitarian effects of 
sanctions are likely to endanger our regional interests in the Middle East, while cyberwarfare is 
not a permanent solution in itself. Thus, none of the current or previously used solutions are 
likely to be completely desirable. 
However, this analysis of how current and previous policies have fallen short may 
provide a platform for possible solutions in future. For example, the potential fallout from 
sanctions’ humanitarian effects suggests that the United States should concentrate on increasing 
more targeted sanctions, specifically ensuring that certain humanitarian necessities—such as 
medicines or parts for passenger planes—be allowed to pass into Iran. It is also possible that 
solutions not previously attempted by the Bush and Obama administrations and thus not 
considered in this paper, such as military action, may be effective.  
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